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Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP61S00527A000100180019-8

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, D/S

DATE: 11 September 1956

FROM : Chief, S/TR

SUBJECT: Re-evaluation of Transportation Items on IL-I

In reviewing the Transportation category of IL-I it was found that the Branch could not comment on items 1441 and 1485. The same is true of items 1415, 1425, 1430 and 1435, but all of latter items are apparently implements of war and fall under Criterion 1. As to the remaining items:

1401 Floating Docks

These are a scarce item in the Soviet Far East and would be useful both in war and in a buildup preparatory to a war in enabling the modification and repair of naval vessels in Soviet Pacific ports. It is felt that they fall under Criterion No. 3, and should continue on the embargo list.

1405 Ice Breakers

The Soviet government has returned to the US all the ice breakers which were loaned to it, and now has in operation the following:

	<u>Ships</u>	<u>Tonnage (GRT)</u>
Over 5,000 GRT	5	28,936
2,500-4,999 GRT	11	46,199
500-2,499 GRT	28	31,989
Under 500 GRT	9	2,434
	<u>53</u>	<u>109,558</u>

Six additional icebreakers averaging 1,500 tons each are known to be in operation.

Under construction are 3 large icebreakers, one of 12,000 tons GRT to be powered by atomic energy being built in the USSR, and two of 6,000 tons each being built in Finland.

Icebreakers are used primarily in the arctic and north Pacific regions. An ample supply of icebreakers would facilitate rapid redeployment of Soviet naval forces in the arctic, and would put the Soviet Fleet and accompanying forces in a position to move at certain seasons of the year against the coasts of such land masses as Greenland, Alaska and northern Canada, while these coasts were inaccessible to other navies.

The rate of buildup of the Soviet icebreaker fleet would seem to be a matter of extreme sensitivity to the free world, and particularly to the

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United States and Canada. As such, in view of the limited number of large icebreakers now available to the USSR, it would seem desirable from a military standpoint to prevent Soviet acquisition of large icebreakers from other sources.

It is recommended in accordance with criterion 3 that icebreakers be retained on the embargoed list.

1410 Tankers, tank barges, whaling factories

The Soviets have completed over 30 10,000 ton capacity ocean-going tankers since the war, and it is believed that six more are in various stages of construction. Under the Sixth Five Year Plan, it is proposed to add approximately 400,000 tons of capacity by 1960. In contrast, the free world has under construction at the present time, 2,824,000 gross tons of tankerage.

The Soviet Bloc is short of tankers at present. Tankers lend flexibility to navies, enabling them to operate at points distant from home bases. As such, they increase a navy's striking and policing power and in an atomic stalemate, its ability to bring pressure to bear on distant countries less well armed. With free world tankerage rapidly expanding, it is possible that the Soviets will find it advantageous to charter tankers for commercial purposes, but these would presumably not be available in a naval crisis.

Owing to their potential as a naval weapon and adjunct, it is felt that tankers fall within the description of Criterion 3, and that they should continue to be embargoed to the Soviet Bloc.

1416 Fishing Vessels

Although more ocean-going fishing vessels are needed by the bloc for legitimate fishing purposes, the movement of such vessels to distant waters, ostensibly for fishing, in the case of the bloc, has not as yet assumed large proportions. In the past this has happened in cases of other countries with aggressive intentions, notably Japan.

Fishing vessels in distant waters can accomplish intelligence objectives and can be used to supply submarines on intelligence or readiness missions. In themselves, they can carry and deliver mines and other destructive weapons. They can readily be converted to small naval craft by mounting of guns, radar and communications equipment. Although not in themselves involving advanced technology, these vessels can readily be equipped with advanced weapons and apparatus.

It is believed that they should continue on the embargo list in accordance with Criterion 3.

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1417 Other Vessels

Most of the vessels in category 1417 are in short supply in the Soviet Bloc, and as naval auxiliaries, a dearth of them limits the flexibility and aggressive power of the Soviet sea forces. Were such vessels to become plentiful in a short time through foreign purchases, the Soviet navy could considerably increase its potential to make a quick strike in areas such as the Baltic and the Far East. Some of these vessels could be used in the same manner as those in category 1416. The value of vessels of this type as auxiliaries to the navy was demonstrated during World War II when the U.S. Navy promptly requisitioned every vessel of this type which could possibly be spared from civilian service. It is felt that they should continue to be embargoed to the bloc under Criterion 3.

1450 Automotive Vehicles or Chassis

These items should be retained on IL-I since the characteristics given are intended to cover military vehicles, or vehicles which are directly usable for military overland transport: 4-wheel drive, command car size and larger, water proofed, equipped with radio suppression. Criterion 1 is the justification for retention of this item on IL-I.

1471 Turbine Locomotives

It would be desirable to retain this on IL-1 because the Soviets have not yet, to our knowledge, produced a turbine locomotive. However, if this item comes under strong attack from other COCOM countries, it could be dropped, since it was originally included in IL-1 on the basis of Criterion 2, and it must be admitted that it does not contribute significantly to Soviet Bloc war potential beyond the contribution made by diesel-electric locomotives which the Soviets are now producing in considerable numbers.

1481 Centralized Traffic Control

It would be desirable to retain this on IL-1 because a small investment in CTC equipment provides a large increase in rail line capacity. However, if this item comes under strong attack from other COCOM countries, it could be dropped, since it was originally included in IL-1 on the basis primarily of Criterion 2. It must be admitted that the Soviets are apparently now producing CTC. In addition, it has been pointed out that the construction of these items is similar to that of dial telephone systems, and the Soviets are producing such systems in significant volume.

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